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Applications of Federal Antitrust
Laws to the Insurance Industry
The McCarran-Ferguson Act generally exempts the insur-
ance industry from federal antitrust laws to the extent
that there is state regulation. This Note attempts to deter-
mine what the Act means by state regulation. After con-
cluding that Congress sought to exempt only effective
regulation, the author finds that federal antitrust laws
apply to the insurance industry only where there is no ef-
fective state legislation or the states lack jurisdictional
power to regulate effectively. Further, the author exam-
ines the increasing scope which is being given to the ex-
ception applying federal antitrust laws to boycotts, coer-
cion, or intimidation regardless of state regulation.
INTRODUCTION
Immediately after the United States Supreme Court decided in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n' that the insur-
ance business was interstate commerce subject to federal regula-
tion, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' The purpose
of this Act was to protect the continued regulation and taxation of
the insurance business by the states. The terms of the McCarran
Act, however, did not overrule the South-Eastern decision. As a
result, the federal government's role in the regulation of the insur-
ance business is unclear, and for more than 15 years the extent to
which the McCarran Act relieves the insurance industry of the fed-
eral antitrust laws' requirements has never been clearly established.
The objective of this Note, therefore, is to examine the McCarran
Act in an attempt to ascertain the extent to which the federal anti-
trust laws remain applicable to the insurance industry.
I. THE PROBLEM
For 75 years3 the United States Supreme Court adhered to the
view that the business of insurance was not commerce within the
1. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
2. 59 Stat.,33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958) [here-
inafter referred to as the McCarran Act].
3. Beginning with Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), the
Supreme Court had held that insurance was not commerce and that in-
surance contracts were not interstate transactions even though the parties
to such contracts were domiciled in different states. This view was fol-
NOTES
meaning of the commerce clause and, therefore, was not subject to
regulation by Congress.4 In 1944, however, the Court changed its
position and held in South-Eastern that insurance is interstate
commerce subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act.5
Congress regarded the South-Eastern decision as "precedent-
smashing";' many observers felt that it endangered traditional
practices long considered essential to the insurance industry.7 The
industry had argued before the Court that "competition in the
field of insurance is detrimental both to the insurers and the in-
sured . . . .,, To Congress they made the prediction that the na-
tural result of increased competition would be to render many
companies insolvent.9 Existing state regulatory statutes were de-
signed, the industry argued, to preserve solvency, and the appli-
cation of the federal antitrust laws to exclude state regulation
might have a disastrous result."0 Congress was also concerned by
lowed by a number of cases. See Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648(1895); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913).
4. The insurance industry vigorously attacked state regulation as being
an unconstitutional restraint on interstate commerce until the danger of
federal control made state regulation an attractive alternative. See H.R.
REP. Nos. 3269 & 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30, 61-62 (1943). In
1868, the Supreme Court decided that insurance was not commerce.
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). During this period, when
state regulation was a reality and federal regulation was non-existent, the
insurance industry often sought federal regulation of insurance, See ABA,
SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW PROCEEDINGS 133 (1944-45).
5. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Only seven Justices sat in the determination
of South-Eastern; only four of these constituted the majority. Thus, a
minority of the full Court reversed the 75-year precedent established by
Paul v. Virginia.
The precise question of whether Congress has the power under the
commerce clause to regulate the insurance business had never been pre-
sented to the Court until South-Eastern. In that case the insurance indus-
try cited cases previously decided against them to support their new posi-
tion. However, the Court reasoned that its prior decisions involved ques-
tions of upholding state law whereas the problem presented in South-
Eastern involved the effective limits of the Sherman Act. Thus, the Court
did not feel bound by its prior decisions. 322 U.S. at 545.
6. See 90 CONG. REc. 6524-25 (1944).
7. Although Attorney General Biddle issued a statement to the contrary,
90 CONG. REc. A3359-60 (1944), many feared that the foundations of
state regulatory and taxing systems had been shaken. S. REP. No. 20, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); 91 CONG. REc. 483-88, 1085-93 (1945). Not all
insurance interests, however, agreed with this view. See statement of Sena-
tor O'Mahoney, H.R. REP. Nos. 3269 & 3270, 78th Cong., 639 (1944);
SAWYER, INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1945). Newspapers gen-
erally criticized the South-Eastern decision. 44 COLUM. L. REv. 772, 773
n.10 (1944).
8. 322 U.S. at 561. See, e.g., Harrington, An Exploration of the Effects
of the S.E.U.A. Decision, 1944 INS. L.J. 590.
9. H.R. REP. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1944).
10. See 91 CONG. REC. 1092 (1945). This fear was found to be exag-
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the refusal of some insurance companies to abide by state regula-
tory provisions or to pay state taxes.1 After South-Eastern these
companies argued that state regulation and taxation were un-
constitutional restraints on interstate commerce. As a result of
these arguments and events, the insurance companies pressed for
legislation in Congress which would authorize continued state reg-
ulation and taxation of the insurance business and which would
exempt the insurance industry from federal antitrust laws. 2
In the session of Congress immediately following the South-
Eastern decision there was virtual unanimity as to the desirability
of protecting the existing state regulatory systems; however, there
were conflicting views as to the extent to which the proposed
legislation should exempt the insurance industry from federal
regulation. A compromise measure known as the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act was passed in 1945. The Act declares that the con-
tinued regulation and taxation of the insurance business by the
states is in the public interest, and it specifically provides that the
insurance business shall be regulated by the states rather than by
the federal government. 3 Nevertheless, the McCarran Act clearly
gerated when the Supreme Court held that the insurance business is within
the states' concurrent power over commerce. As long as Congress has
not pre-empted the field, the states are free to regulate. Robertson v. Cali-
fornia, 328 U.S. 440 (1946). The Robertson case upheld state regulation
which limited the activities of unadmitted insurers or unlicensed agents.
The Court held that state power did not necessarily depend on congression-
al authorization through the McCarran Act. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), which held that the Sherman Act did not apply to an agricul-
tural marketing combination operating under the authority of state law.
The Parker case suggests that regulated rate-making by state bureaus is
valid even without congressional authorization. SAWYER, INSURANCE AS IN-
TERSTATE COMMERCE 149-50 (1945). See text commencing at note 112
infra.
11.
But this emergency is immediate and it is necessary to pass this legis-
lation now. The States do not know what to do with respect to the
collection of taxes and the insurance companies do not know what
to do with respect to the payment of taxes.
91 CoNG. REc. 1092 (1945).
Bills were introduced in Congress during the pendancy of the South-
Eastern case to exempt insurance from all federal legislation and to vali-
date continued state taxation and regulation. S. 1362, H.R. 3270, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). The House passed its bill by a vote of 283 to 54,
90 CONG. REc. 6565 (1944), but the bill failed to pass the Senate largely
because of the vigorous opposition of Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming.
See Time, Dec. 13, 1943, p. 82.
12. See 23 CHm.-KENT L. REV. 317 (1945) for a detailed account of
the legislative history of the McCarran Act.
13. Sections 1 and 2(a) provide:
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest,
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to
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provides that the federal antitrust laws remain applicable in at
least two situations. First, section 2(b) provides that while federal
antitrust laws do not supersede state laws regulating and taxing
the insurance business, they are applicable to the insurance indus-
try to the extent that state laws do not regulate insurance compa-
nies." ' Second, section 3(b) provides that nothing in the McCar-
ran Act shall affect the Sherman Act's prohibition of actual or
attempted acts of boycott, coercion or intimidation.15
II. THE EFFECT OF STATE REGULATION
UNDER THE McCARRAN ACT
A. THE BASIC POLICY OF THE MCCARRAN ACT
Section 2(a) of the McCarran Act provides that the business of
insurance "shall be subject to the laws of the several States
... ,,11 The House report indicates that Congress wanted the
states to retain the control they enjoyed over the insurance business
prior to South-Eastern-subject to the exception contained in the
proviso to section 2(b).Y This proviso states that the Sherman,
Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts apply to the insur-
ance business "to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law."' However, section 2(b) also adds that no other
impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by
the several States.
The business of insurance and every person engaged therein shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regu-
lation or taxation of such business.
59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012(a) (1958).
14. Section 2(b) provides:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insur-
ance: Provided, That after January 1, 1948 . . . the Sherman' Act
• . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act[s]
. . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that
such business is not regulated by State law.
59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1958).
15. Section 3(b) provides: "Nothing contained in this Act shall render the
said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation." 59 Stat. 34 (1945),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1958).
16. See note 13 supra.
17. H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945); 91 CONG. REc.
1481 (1945) (remarks of Senator Ferguson).
18. Because of defective drafting of the McCarran Act, some questions
have been raised whether the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable to the
insurance business. E.g., Stone & Campbell, Insurance and the Robinson-
Patman Act, 1949 INS. L.J. 553. Section 3(a) of the McCarran Act pro-
vided for a three-year moratorium which suspended the application of the
1962] NOTES 1091
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federal law shall apply to the insurance business unless it "spe-
cifically relates" to that business.
In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,9 the Supreme Court
noted that the purpose of the McCarran Act was "to give support
to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing
the business of insurance" by specifically disclaiming any federal
pre-emption of the field; it thereby prevented the state systems
from being unconstitutional burdens on interstate commerce.2"
This purpose was effectuated by delegating to the states Con-
gress' power to regulate and tax insurance as interstate commerce.
While the Court in Benjamin proclaimed that the primary intent
of the statute was to insulate the insurance industry from fed-
eral regulation, the Court did not decide the extent to which Con-
gress intended to abdicate federal control. Subsequent decisions
by the federal appellate courts have produced a diversity of opin-
ion on this point.2 In 1960, the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify this issue in FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n2" when it
stated that the basic policy of the McCarran Act "was to allay
doubts, thought to have been raised by [the decision of the Su-
preme Court in South-Eastern] as to the continuing power of the
States to tax and regulate the business of insurance."' Here the
Court emphasized that the Act was designed to permit the con-
tinued exercise of state power rather than to prevent the exercise
Sherman, Clayton, FTC and Robinson-Patman Acts to the insurance busi-
ness. The implication of this section was that after the moratorium period
the acts enumerated would be applicable to the insurance business un-
less limited by other provisions of the McCarran Act. But § 2(b), in its
enumeration of the federal antitrust laws applicable to the insurance busi-
ness after the moratorium, failed to include the Robinson-Patman Act
even though all other Acts listed in § 3(a) were included. Thus, the Mc-
Carran Act did not clearly indicate whether the Robinson-Patman Act
applied to the insurance industry. On the other hand, the Robinson-Patman
Act is substantially contained in the Clayton Act-only the criminal pro-
visions are excluded. Therefore, the omission of the Robinson-Patman Act
from § 2(b) has not prevented its application to the insurance business.
19. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
20. Id. at 429-30.
21. The Eighth Circuit took a limited view of the extent to which the
federal government intended to abdicate its power in favor of the states.
It stated that the purpose of the McCarran Act was "to continue the
regulation of the insurance business, unhampered . .. by federal legisla-
tion relating to interstate commerce." North Little Rock Transp. Co. v.
Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 181 F.2d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1950). (Emphasis
added.) The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, indicated that in its opinion
the McCarran Act was intended to yield control of the insurance industry
to those states which had undertaken or would undertake to regulate the
insurance business. American Hosp. & Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d
719, 723 (5th Cir. 1957), aff d, 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
22. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
23. Id. at 299.
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of federal power. 4 The insurance industry's main objection to
federal control-the possibility of insolvency through "uncon-
trolled" competition-seems to be adequately met by this permis-
sive approach. If the states are concerned with the adverse effect
of federal antitrust laws upon the solvency of the insurance compa-
nies, they are free to "pre-empt" the area under the McCarran
Act. On the other hand, where the states have not regulated or
where they are unable to regulate, the Act provides for the ap-
plication of federal antitrust laws so as to prevent "gaps" or "voids"
in the overall antitrust program.
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF REGULATION
The McCarran Act, as amended, provided for a three-year mora-
torium period during which the federal antitrust laws did not ap-
ply to the insurance industry.2" The purpose of the moratorium
was to provide the states with an opportunity to regulate the in-
surance business and to pre-empt the application of the federal
antitrust laws.26 All states took advantage of this opportunity by
passing laws specifically designed to preclude the application
of the federal antitrust laws after the termination of the moratori-
um. For example, all states enacted Fair Trade Practices acts
applicable to the insurance business.2 These state laws have been
construed as preventing the FTC from exercising jurisdiction over
the insurance industry." Other state statutes which are not spe-
cifically related to insurance but which prescribe general business
standards similar to federal antitrust law may also preclude federal
regulation." Such legislation, however, does not necessarily
amount to regulation within the meaning of the McCarran Act;
regulation may mean something more than legislation.
1. The meaning of "regulated by State law"
The proviso to section 2(b) limits the application of federal
24. Id. at 297-302.
25. 59 Stat. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1958). The
"moratorium" period was scheduled to end January 1, 1948, but Con-
gress extended it to June 30, 1948. 61 Stat. 448 (1947).
26. See 91 CONG. REC. 1442-44 (1945).
27. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS 150 (1960) [hereinafter cited as NAIC PROCEEDINGS].
See also Donovan, Insurance-The Case in Favor of Existing Exemptions
from the Antitrust Law, 20 FED. BJ. 56, 63 (1960).
28. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 72.20 (1957). All the states and Puerto Rico
have adopted similar legislation that defines conduct which constitutes un-
fair competition.
29. See FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
30. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co.,
163 F. Supp. 274, 278-80 (D. Mont. 1958) (state statute prohibiting
monopolies and conspiracies in restraint of trade).
1962] NOTES 1093
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antitrust laws to the business of insurance "to the extent that such
business is riot regulated by State law.""1 The principal prob-
lem created by this proviso is in the meaning of the word "regu-
lated."32 Since the Act gives no indication of what constitutes
state regulation, the Act's underlying policies must be examined
to ascertain its meaning.3 s
The McCarran Act was designed to continue state regulation
of the insurance business. Congress determined that the states
were better equipped than the federal government to regulate the
insurance industry because of their proximity to the local insur-
ance industry's problems and because of their experience and ex-
pertness in regulating the industry." Nonetheless, Congress did
seek to place some limitation on the pre-eminent position given
state regulation. By providing that federal antitrust laws were
still applicable to the extent that the states failed to regulate, Con-
gress apparently sought to balance its protection of state regula-
tion with the requirement that there be complete regulation
(whether state or federal). Maintenance of a balance between these
interests would seem to require that federal antitrust laws should be
pre-empted only if a state's insurance laws (1) cover the subject
matter, (2) regulate the subject matter to the extent state power
permits, and (3) provide for effective administration of the laws
applying to the subject matter.
31. See note 14 supra.
32. Legislation does not necessarily indicate regulation. Normally, some
officer or agency responsible for enforcement of the state's legislation
would seem to be needed in order to effectively regulate. There is language
in FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958), which indicates
that federal antitrust laws may be applicable if a state's legislation falls
short of regulation. See note 37 infra.
Also state laws must regulate the same subject as the federal laws they
preclude. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life
Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958). What is not clear, however, is
whether a state has regulated when it has legislated on the subject gen-
erally or whether each specific point of the federal act must be eclipsed
by a corresponding provision in a state law.
33. This proviso could be construed to mean that the federal antitrust
laws remain applicable whenever regulation under state law fails to meet
the standards of federal antitrust law. Such an interpretation would require
the enactment of uniform antitrust laws by the states-patterned after the
federal statutes-if federal regulation is to be precluded. The Supreme
Court has rejected this approach. Instead, in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Ben-jamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), the Court determined that as a necessary
corollary to the adoption of the McCarran Act, Congress must have
determined that uniform state regulation of the insurance industry is not
necessary. Congress must have been aware, the Court reasoned, of the di-
versity of state laws regulating insurance when it passed the McCarran
Act. Id. at 430.
34. 91 CONG. REC. 1482 (1945).
1094
Some cases suggest that a state has "regulated" whenever it has
"legislated" unless it is shown that the legislation is a mere sham
to avoid federal regulation. For example, in North Little Rock
Transp. Co.,35 the Eighth Circuit, in affirming a summary judg-
ment for the defendant on an allegation of combination in re-
straint of trade, did not inquire beyond the fact that the state had
a statute which authorized the licensing of rating bureaus. This
was held to be sufficient to meet the requirement of "regulation."
Again, in FTC v. National Casualty Co., 6 the Supreme Court
held that a state insurance law which "authorizes enforcement
through a scheme of administered supervision" constitutes "regu-
lation. '3 7 One federal district court has relied upon this language
in National Casualty to assert that "a State regulates the business
of insurance within the meaning of [section] 1012(b) [section
2(b)] when a State statute generally proscribes or permits or au-
thorizes certain conduct on the part of the insurance compa-
nies. ' 3S
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized that
some types of state legislation may fail to constitute state regula-
tion because the subject matter may not be open to effective ad-
ministration. In FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n,39 the Court held
that the FTC had jurisdiction to control the false advertising prac-
tices of a Nebraska insurance company. The insurer had con-
tended that since Nebraska's statute prohibiting false advertising
applied to out-of-state violations by a domiciled insurer, this con-
stituted regulation within the meaning of section 2(b). The
Court rejected this reasoning; it argued that "regulated by State
law" means regulation by the state in which the illegal activities
took place rather than regulation by a sister state.4" On remand,
the Eighth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's view and held
35. North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 181
F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950).
36. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
37. The FTC argued that "a general prohibition designed to guarantee
certain standards of conduct is too 'inchoate' to be 'regulation' until that
prohibition has been crystalized into 'administrative elaboration of these
standards and application in individual cases.' " While the Court rejected
this view, it noted that a distinction might be drawn between "legislation"
and "regulation." 357 U.S. at 564, 565. The idea that a state by merely
passing legislation may not have regulated within the meaning of § 2(b) of
the McCarran Act was apparently original with the Court since the "pe-
titioner does not argue that the statutory provisions here under review
were a mere pretence." Ibid.
38. California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp. 857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (citations omitted).
39. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
40. Id. at 299-300.
1962] NOTES 1095
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1088
that an insurance company is not regulated by state law unless
the company is subject to the state's legal process.4
The Supreme Court's approach in FTC v. Travelers Health
Ass'n seems to be the better view. The Court indicated that sec-
tion 2(b) pre-empts the federal law only if the subject matter is
within the state's jurisdictional power and if the state insurance
law provides for effective administration. 42 The insurance indus-
try constitutes a substantial segment of the national economy; ob-
viously, it alone should not be allowed to operate outside of both
state and federal antitrust laws. One illustration of the dangers
which result from a failure to enforce state insurance laws in-
'\olves the insurance rating bureau. These bureaus are private
agencies comprised of various representatives of the local insur-
ance industry. They are permitted by state law to establish rates-
subject to the state insurance commissioner's approval. While the
McCarran Act's legislative history indicates that Congress was
willing to allow state-controlled rating bureaus to be exempt
from federal antitrust laws,4" some states are unable to con-
trol effectively the operations of these bureaus.44 As a result
these bureaus tend to ignore the public interest and to fix rates in
excess of loss ratios. 45 This failure by the states to regulate ef-
41. 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).
42. This appears to have been the view of the President and some
members of the Senate. See Letter From Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sena-
tor Radcliffe, 91 CONG. REc. 482 (1945), and the remarks of Senator
Murdock, id. at 1482. However, at times in the debate, "legislation" and
"regulation" were equated, e.g., remarks of Senator Ferguson, id. at 1481.
But see McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium Under Pub-
lic Law 15 Expired July 1, 34 A.B.A.J. 539, 542 (1948), where one of the
authors of the bill concluded:
Thus for purposes of enforcement of federal laws, the question is one
strictly of legal construction. The inquiry will be: "Is this practice reg-
ulated by State law?" -not "Is it effectively regulated?" or "Is it wise-
ly regulated?" but simply: "Is it regulated?"
However, during the congressional debates, Senator McCarran observed
that federal regulation would only be precluded by effective state regula-
tion. 91 CONG. REc. 1444 (1945). See generally 60 MIcH. L. REV. 392,
393 (1962).
43. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 1481 (1945) (remarks of Senator Mur-
dock).
44. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at
1051-52, 1067, 1075 (1959). See also Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of
State Insurance Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical
Perspective, 56 MicH. L. REv. 545, 556-65 (1958); 58 MICH. L. REV.
730, 751-53 (1960). For a summary of the nature of rating bureaus, see
Dirlam & Stelzer, The Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Worka-
bility of Regulated Competition, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 208, 211-15 (1959).
45. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at
1520-21 (1959).
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fectively allows conduct which is not subject to state control to be
immune from federal regulation. The objectives of the McCarran
Act are frustrated. They will continue to be thwarted unless "regu-
lated by State law" is construed as requiring state legislation
which covers the subject matter, regulates the subject matter to the
outer limits of state power, and provides for effective administra-
tion.46
2. Impediments to state regulation
Even if a state's laws are effectively administered, there may be
some areas which the state cannot "regulate" and which, there-
fore, may not be exempt from the federal antitrust laws. Because
there are effective limits on the state's power,47 the state may lack
the power to assert its jurisdiction over "foreign" insurance com-
panies and thus fall short of the McCarran Act's requirement of
"regulation." This jurisdictional disability, therefore, may deter-
mine whether the state can effectively regulate an insurer and,
thus, whether federal antitrust laws apply.
(a) The unauthorized foreign insurer 4
The unauthorized foreign mail-order insurer, with its apparent
immunity from state regulation, has created an area of conflict
between the state regulatory bodies and the FTC.49 In National
Casualty the FTC ordered two "foreign" insurance companies to
stop sending deceptive advertising to their agents in other states,
where they were not licensed, for local distribution.0 The states
in which the advertising was being distributed did have statutes
prohibiting false and misleading advertising. Only an insubstan-
46. Nevertheless, the burden should be on the party seeking to apply
federal antitrust laws to show the ineffectiveness of state regulation. Con-
gress obviously sought to allow the states some discretion in the area of
regulation.
47. The jurisdictional problem involves more than the mere effectiveness
of the state's legislation. It involves the effective limits of the state's legis-
lative power. Without the power to assert its legislative jurisdiction over
foreign insurance companies, a state cannot satisfy the McCarran Act's
requirement of "regulation" in any area involving companies not other-
wise subject to that state's service of process.
48. "Unauthorized foreign insurer" denotes an insurance company which
is neither domiciled in nor licensed by the state in which it is soliciting
business. Thus, the would-be regulating state does not have the sanction of
license withdrawal available.
49. The FTC has asserted that there is an " 'irreducible area' of Com-
mission jurisdiction" in which federal authority must be exercised over
activities which cannot be reached by state laws. American Hosp. & Life
Ins. Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719, 724 (5th Cir. 1957). See also Bergson,
Regulation v. Competition, 1956 INs. L.J. 703, 707.
50. 357 U.S. at 562.
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tial amount of the advertising ever reached the public without
going through a licensed agent.5 Thus, despite the FTC's conten-
tion that there was a jurisdictional "gap," the dissemination of the
advertising was subject to statutory controls in every state in which
it was distributed.52 In this situation the Court held that the Mc-
Carran Act prevented the FTC from exercising jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in a 1960 case, FTC v. Travelers Health
Ass'n,53 an unauthorized foreign insurer mailed misleading and
deceptive advertising directly to the public. Because the insurer
had no agents in the "receiving" state, the "receiving" state did
not have the direct regulatory power over the insurer which was
available in National Casualty. Thus, it would have been difficult
for the "receiving" state to bring effective action against the in-
surer.5" Despite this fundamental difference, the Eighth Circuit,
relying upon National Casualty, held that the FTC could not as-
sume jurisdiction because the laws of the state in which the in-
surer was domiciled prohibited55 the dissemination by its domi-
ciliaries of false and misleading advertising in any other state."5
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court adopted the view that the
McCarran Act was not meant to force residents of one state to
rely upon the legislation of other states to protect them from de-
ceptive advertising practices. 57 Thus, a state's attempted regula-
tion of extraterritorial advertising practices does not prevent the
FTC from taking jurisdiction over these activities.
Of course, this result in FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n does not
prevent the "receiving" state (1) from exercising its jurisdiction
and (2) from controlling these deceptive advertising practices. In
1950, in Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,55 the Supreme
Court upheld Virginia's exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-
state mail-order insurer which did not act through local agents.
The insurer's 800 policyholders in Virginia constituted its "mini-
51. Ibid.
52.
Whatever may have been the intent of Congress with regard to inter-
state insurance practices which the states cannot for constitutional rea-
sons regulate effectively, that intent is irrelevant in the cases before
us. Respondents' advertising programs require distribution by their lo-
cal agents, and there is no question but that the States possess ample
means to regulate this advertising within their respective boundaries.
Id. at 564.
53. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
54. This is not to say that the states lack power to'regulate in this area.
See notes 58-64 infra and accompanying text.
55. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-1503 (Supp. 1957).
56. Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 262 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1959).
57. 362 U.S. at 299-300.
58. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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mum contact" with the state.59 Seven years later, in McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co.,60 the Court extended its application of
the "minimum contacts" theory to a situation where the insurer
had only one policyholder within the state. While the insurer in
McGee did not regularly advertise by mail in the "receiving"
state as it did in Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, the deliv-
ery of the contract, the mailing of the premiums, and the resi-
dence of the insured in the "receiving" state were sufficient for
jurisdiction."'
The Supreme Court has held that the "receiving" state not only
has the power to exercise jurisdiction over the unauthorized for-
eign insurer, but it also has a substantial interest to protect.6 '
Otherwise the only forum available for injured policyholders would
be the insurer's domicile.6 3 Thus, convenience and expense
favor regulation by the "receiving" as well as domiciliary state."
Since the states do have the power to exercise jurisdiction over
and control the practices of unauthorized foreign insurers without
agents in the "receiving" state, the question arises as to whether
the states can effectively regulate these out-of-state mail-order in-
surers. If they can, the Supreme Court could be faced with the
question of whether the McCarran Act prevents the application of
federal antitrust laws in a situation which combines the facts of
National Casualty and FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n.65 But it is
not clear whether the "receiving" state can effectively regulate
in this area. While nearly all states have enacted service of process
statutes whereby certain activities of an unauthorized foreign in-
surer constitute the appointment of the state insurance commis-
sioner as the insurer's attorney for service of process,6" this
59. Id. at 648.
60. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
61. Id. at 223.
62. 339 U.S. at 648.
63. Ibid.
64. "These [receiving state's] residents would be at a severe disadvan-
tage if they were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant
State in order to hold it legally accountable." 355 U.S. at 223.
65. See FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 298 n.4 (1960),
where the Court anticipated but did not resolve this problem. The F1C had
argued that the receiving state's laws did not purport to reach the unau-
thorized foreign insurer mailing advertising to the states' residents, and
even if this is the purport of these state laws, they do not pre-empt federal
regulation because of their inability to regulate effectively.
66. 1 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 150 (1960). The service of process statutes
were enacted to aid the enforcement of a state's Fair Trade Practices
Act. Upon a determination that the out-of-state insurer has violated that
law, the state insurance commissioner may issue a cease and desist order
to the insurer. Upon failure to comply with the order the commissioner
then proceeds in the "receiving" state's courts under the service of process
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does not guarantee effective regulation. First, the service of proc-
ess act (supported by the "minimum contact" theory) is applied
only after a policy has been sold in a state.67 Second, state judg-
ments against out-of-state mail-order insurers may be "penal judg-
ments" unenforceable in the insurance company's domiciliary
state thus emasculating the effect of state enforcement. The re-
ceiving state's judgment is based on a violation of its Fair Trade
Practices Act which provides for a fine when the insurer fails to
comply with the commissioner's cease and desist order.6s
The judgment obtained in the "receiving" state may not be
enforceable in the insurer's domicile because penal actions need
not be given full faith and credit by a sister state.69 There is,
however, some question as to whether the penal action rule ap-
plies to the enforcement of a penal judgment. In Milwaukee Coun-
ty v. M. E. White Co.7" the Supreme Court recognized that for
the purposes of applying the full faith and credit clause, a dis-
tinction exists between a penal action and a judgment obtained on
such an action. The Court declined to decide whether a judg-
ment obtained under a penal statute would be entitled to full faith
and credit.7 However, this in itself is significant, for prior to
Milwaukee County the Court had held that a judgment obtained
under a penal statute was subject to the same rule as the penal ac-
tion itself.7" The vigor of the penal action rule as it relates to
judgments, therefore, is now subject to considerable doubt.73 It
statute seeking a judgment for a money "penalty" against the insurer. E.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60.922 (Supp. 1961).
67. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the state insurance
commissioner probably cannot act when the false advertising first enters
the state; he must wait until policies are sold to residents in the state. How-
ever, since the requirements of "minimum contacts" are easily met-by
the sale of one policy in the state-the practical result is that the states
can readily acquire jurisdiction over the operations of the unauthorized
foreign insurer.
68. The Unfair Trade Practices Act usually provides that any person
who violates a cease and desist order issued by the insurance commissioner
is liable to the state for a penalty not to exceed a certain sum. The penalty
is recoverable by a civil action. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 72.31 (1957).
69. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Wisconsin v. Pelican
Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66
(1825).
70. 296 U.S. 268, 278 (1935).
71. Id. at 279.
72. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888).
73. Thus, a judgment which includes a penalty, such as a judgment ob-
tained for a Fair Trade Practices Act violation, may be subject to full
faith and credit and enforceable in the insurer's domicile. See Paulsen,
Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. REv. 202,
207-08 (1957). Contra, Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory"
Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. REv. 268, 279-84 (1960).
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may no longer be a formidable barrier to the state regulation of
an unauthorized insurer."
(b) Clayton Act violations
Fearing that merger activity would tend to weaken competitive
forces through the development of undue concentrations in an in-
dustry, Congress enacted section 7 of the Clayton Act. It was in-
tended to prevent mergers which would "substantially lessen com-
petition, or tend to create a monopoly."75 Section 2(b) of the
McCarran Act, however, restricts the application of section 7 where
the merger involves two insurance companies.76 To the extent that
state laws regulate such mergers, the McCarran Act exempts them
from the effects of the Clayton Act.
In contrast to other areas of insurance regulation, most states
did not respond to the McCarran Act's invitation for state regula-
tion of insurance company mergers; only a minority of states
passed laws designed to regulate acquisitions forbidden by section
7 of the Clayton Act, and those states which did act often en-
acted laws too limited to prevent the application of the Clayton
Act. First, some are patterned after the original, unamended ver-
sion of section 7 and, as a result, do not regulate asset acquisi-
tions.77 Where a state's laws are limited in this manner, asset ac-
quisitions are subject to section 7. Second, the state laws usually
do not regulate mergers between domestic and out-of-state insur-
ers. For example, Pennsylvania's "Little Clayton Act" only applies
to mergers involving domestic insurance companies.7" Third, the
74. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962),
where the court seems to predict the death of the penal action rule.
The old artificial notion that decrees or judgments involving penal-
ties of any form were entirely outside the full faith and credit clause
is, of course, no longer the law. . . . But it cannot be said, we think,
that the decisions of the Supreme Court have yet wiped out every
possible vestige of that concept.
Id. at 825. See also McCarter, Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail Or-
der Accident and Health Insurance Policies and Advertising, 23 INS. COUN-
SEL J. 82, 92-93 (1956). Contra, 59 MicH. L. Rnv. 794, 797-98 (1961).
75. 38 Stat. 732 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
76. See note 14 supra.
77. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 38-37 (1958), which provides:
Any domestic insurance company may retain or acquire the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital of other insurance
corporations, provided no insurance corporation shall, by reason of
such retention or acquisition of stock or other share capital, conduct
its business with the public in a manner which substantially lessens
competition or tends to create a monopoly.
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 459.1 (1954).
Even where the state law purports to control mergers with an out-of-
state insurer, problems arise on the face of the statutes. For example, in
Louisiana a domestic insurance company seeking to merge with another in-
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state's control may amount to little more than requiring an in-
surance company to report a proposed merger. The Connecticut
merger statute is an illustration of this limitation of state regula-
tion 7 9 While the statute requires the state insurance commis-
sioner's approval of a merger, he probably cannot refuse to ap-
prove a merger on antitrust grounds alone."0 Again, the extent to
which a state's failure to enforce its merger statutes will allow the
Clayton Act to apply depends on the meaning of "regulated by
State law" in section 2 (b).1
Another factor which affects the application of section 7 of the
Clayton Act to the insurance industry is the existence of two sig-
nificant exceptions to section 7. The first permits acquisitions for
investment purposes. 2 This provision is important to the insur-
ance industry because acquisitions for investment purposes are
quite common. However, the few cases which have considered
the investment exception have applied a strict standard and, there-
surance company is required to submit to the insurance commissioner, for
his approval, a merger plan. After a hearing and a finding that the plan is
"fair, equitable, [and] consistent with law" the merger is allowed to pro-
ceed. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:731 (1959). If an authorized foreign in-
surer has merged in another state, a copy of the "approved" merger
must be deposited with the Secretary of State of Louisiana. If one of the
parties to the merger was not licensed in Louisiana, a financial report of
this insurer must be submitted to the commissioner. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:990 (Supp. 1962). If a domestic insurer merges with a foreign in-
surer, Louisiana antitrust law will prohibit the merger if it tends to sub-
stantially lessen competition. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:125 (1959). The
Louisiana scheme is extensive; however, even if all states were to adopt
similar legislation, insurance mergers would not be effectively regulated.
The problem may be illustrated by the following: Blackstone Life Insur-
ance Co., a domiciliary of state X and licensed to do business in state Y
seeks to merge with Security Life, a domiciliary of state Z which is also
licensed in state Y. Thus, under the provisions noted above, states X and
Z have jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of the merger. State
Y does not have such power. State Y may demand a financial report after
the fact of merger, but may not act before the merger has occurred, even
though the combination may substantially lessen competition in that state.
Further, the other states of the union, whose interests may be affected
no less than state Y's are also unable to object to the merger. The end
result, therefore, of the Louisiana type of legislation is to put national in-
terests in the hands of the two states of domicile of merging parties. Such
a regulatory scheme is subject to the criticism of Travelers Health Ass'n
v. FTC; it should not preclude federal regulation.
Nineteen states have passed statutes designed to deal with interlock-
ing directorates. See Donovan, Insurance-The Case in Favor of Existing
Exemptions from the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. 56, 63 n.32 (1960).
However, all of these statutes have the same disability noted in the Louisi-
ana statute. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60.582 (Supp. 1961).
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 38-35 (1958).
80. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 38-42 (1958).
81. See note 34 supra and text following.
82. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
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fore, the usefulness of this exception is quite limited." The other
exception involves mergers with failing corporations. While Con-
gress has clearly approved this exception first enunciated in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. FTC," it is difficult to apply. The difficulty
arises in trying to limit this exception to firms which have not en-
tered into bankruptcy, but which are heading in that direction.
The very fact that the acquiring corporation seeks to purchase the
"failing" company's stock or assets seems to belie the existence
of this situation. 5
III. FEDERAL JURISDICTION DESPITE STATE
REGULATION-THE BOYCOTT EXCEPTION
Section 3(b) of the McCarran Act provides that the Sherman
Act's prohibitions against boycotts, coercion, and intimidation con-
tinue to apply to the insurance industry; their application is unaf-
fected by state regulation."6 The primary reason for this excep-
tion was to insure that the safeguards provided by the "core" of
the Sherman Act were maintained.17 Although the legislative his-
tory is inconclusive, Congress apparently feared that the regulation
83. The courts are skeptical about a company's acquisition of stock in a
competitor for "investment purposes" and will examine such an acquisition
very closely. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586 (1957); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar
Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.
1958); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.
Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). On the other hand, all of these
cases can be distinguished from the insurance situation and can be ex-
plained on other grounds.
84. 280 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1930). See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1950); H.R. REp. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1949).
85. See Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26, 47-48 (1956), where the "ab-
sorbed" company had the ability to continue operating and was not com-pelled by financial considerations to terminate. The Commission, proceed-
ing under a "presumption" of illegality, went beyond the acquisition con-
tract to discover whether the acquiring company sought to lessen compe-
tition.
Despite the general application of § 7 to the insurance industry be-
cause there is no applicable state merger law or because the state's regu-
lation is inadequate, insurance company mergers have not been prosecuted
under § 7. However, this does not mean that future (or past) mergers will
be immune from attack. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), where a stock acquisition occurring over 30
years earlier was attacked under § 7.
86. See note 15 supra.
87. It has been argued that the statutory provision, "Nothing contained
in this chapter," should be read as "Nothing contained in this section" and,
therefore, § 3(b) means that the insurance business was subject to the boy-
cott provisions of the Sherman Act only during the three-year moratorium
period. This strained construction was rejected in United States v. Insur-
ance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684, 690 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
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of boycotts, coercion, and intimidation would not be effectively
maintained by the states and that the public interest required the
Sherman Act's continued protection against such practices, s
Recently, the boycott exception in section 3(b) has been ac-
quiring an ever-increasing significance. The federal government
has begun to assume jurisdiction in areas previously thought to be
pre-empted by the states under section 2(b).89
A. FEDERAL ACTION
The boycott provisions of the Sherman Act have now been
given an expanded interpretation under section 3(b). In addition,
state action no longer converts a group boycott into an exempted
activity. Even though a group boycott is approved by a state li-
censed rating bureau, it is still subject to the Sherman Act prohi-
bitions.
A district court in Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co.
v. Bankers Life Co." held that an allegation by a newly formed
life insurance company that its competitors were conspiring to
restrain its operation of business was sufficient to allow it to bring
suit under the Sherman Act as provided in section 3(b). The al-
leged conspirators had published handbills and other advertising
designed to discourage the public from dealing with the plaintiff.
The court said that although the conspiracy was a "boycott by
peaceful persuasion" and not a typical boycott, nonetheless the
Sherman Act applied under section 3 (b).
The tendency of the federal courts to extend relief under the
boycott provision of section 3(b) was further demonstrated in
1959 in California League of Independent Ins. Producers v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.9 In Aetna the plaintiff, an association of
insurance agents, alleged that the defendants had acted in concert
as a rating bureau to decrease commission rates on automobile
policies. Because California had expressly authorized cooperation
among insurers in establishing insurance rates, the state was held
to have regulated within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Mc-
Carran Act; therefore, the court held that the complaint failed to
88. See91 CONG. Ruc. 1481-89 (1945).
89. Section 3(b) of the McCarran Act had never been applied until
United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio
1956). There, an insurance agents association's rules were not illegal per
se, but on the facts admitted a "direct-writer" rule was held to constitute
an unreasonable restraint of trade. Although it did not present a unique
situation within the insurance industry, this "first case" was brought eleven
years after the passage of the McCarran Act.
90. 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958).
91. 179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
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state a claim under the Sherman Act within the meaning of sec-
tion 3(b).11 Following this decision, the insurance agents amend-
ed their complaint to allege that the defendants had induced other
insurers to refrain from doing business with insurance agents ex-
cept at set commission rates and that defendants had conspired
to refuse to do business except at such rates. This allegation of a
boycott was sufficient to give the federal court jurisdiction.93 Thus,
an important aspect of federal regulation under the McCarran
Act was established. The California statute,94 as in most states,95
authorized cooperation among the members of the local insur-
ance industry in establishing rates. As a result, bureaus were cre-
ated which are comprised of representatives of the various com-
panies. These bureaus prescribe rates subject to the state insurance
commissioner's approval. As previously noted,9" the control which
these bureaus may exercise over the insurance industry is con-
siderable because they are often the state insurance commis-
sioner's sole fact-finding board. Now, Aetna makes it clear that
the activities of these bureaus are subject to the Sherman Act's
boycott provisions under section 3(b) of the McCarran Act de-
spite the fact that the bureaus operate with state approval.
The rules and practices of insurance trade associations have
also been attacked under section 3(b) for creating competitive
disadvantages for nonmembers. For example, a rule which de-
clared that any agent who solicited business in the county for non-
member companies was ineligible for membership in the associa-
tion was held to be an abusive trade practice (a boycott) under
section 3(b) in United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland.97
This "direct-writer" rule, which excluded agents placing insur-
ance with companies also making sales directly to policyhold-
ers, was held an unreasonable restraint of trade "on the facts ad-
92. Accord, North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch.,
181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950), where the court held that state regulation
of an insurance rating bureau's price-fixing precluded a private treble dam-
age action under the Sherman Act.
93. The court would not distinguish between an absolute refusal to deal
and a refusal to deal except at a fixed price.
There is no reason to hold that § 3 (b) withholds immunity in case of
an actual total boycott, but grants antitrust immunity for a threatened
total or partial boycott. Section 3(b) permits a Sherman Act suit in
a state regulated phase of the insurance industry if conduct amounts
to boycott, coercion or intimidation. These are the methods to ef-
fectuate the refusal to deal except at the agreed price.
179 F. Supp. at 66.
94. CAL. INS. CODE § 1850.
95. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 70.65 (1957).
96. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
97. 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
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mitted."9  The court's approach was followed in United States
v. New Orleans Ins. Exch.99 where another trade association of
insurance agents enforced a similar "direct-writer" rule. L°° The
Supreme Court approved in a per curiam opinion °101
The Insurance Board of Cleveland was involved in further
litigation when its rule barring member-agents from doing busi-
ness with any mutual company was challenged under the Sher-
man Act."0 2 Although many independent agents still did business
with both stock and mutual companies, the federal district court
held that the rule was an abusive trade practice constituting a
group boycott. The fact that individual member-agents were free
to choose whether they would join or retain membership in the
association did not prevent the court from finding a boycott; their
behavior as members was determined by the association.
This extension of federal action under section 3(b) seems to
be desirable. The group action in Banker's Life to induce a public
boycott by an advertising campaign is analytically indistinguish-
able from traditional boycott procedures. In either case,
group action is being used to coerce an outside or noncomply-
ing party to adhere to the group's rules. Similarly, in Aetna a trade
association was attempting to coerce noncomplying agents by
inducing insurance companies to refrain from doing business with
98. The court applied the "rule of reason" to determine the illegality
of the direct-writer rule. Trade association rules, however, may also be il-
legal per se where they are obviously designed to restrict competition. An
example of a per se violation is the "non-deviation" rule. It prohibits
agents who represent companies which deviate from rates established by
rating bureaus from becoming association members. Its obvious purpose
is to prevent insurers from offering deviation rates by forcing deviating
companies to sell through nonmember agents. Since a deviating company
must depend on independent agents to sell its policies, substantial market
opportunities may not be available. See generally Note, Rules of Inde-
pendent Insurance Agents' Associations Under the Sherman Act, 105 U.
PA. L. REv. 977 (1957).
99. 148 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. La.), affd, 355 U.S. 22, rehearing denied,
355 U.S. 908 (1957).
100. The association solicited insurance and placed it with one or more
of the several companies represented by it. The association's agencies
owned the "expirations" on the policies handled by them (the property
right which inheres in having sold the original policy and in knowing when
that policy will expire). This ownership generally gives the owner effective
control over renewals. The direct-writer rule was strictly enforced and
any member who did not conform to its provisions was subject to expul-
sion from the association. The court held that while such a rule did not
constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act, it did impose unreason-
able restraints on interstate commerce in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act.
101. 355 U.S. 22 (1957).
102. United States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 188 F. Supp. 949(N.D. Ohio 1960).
1106
them. State approval of this boycott through its rating bureau
was rightly held not to have affected the application of the Sher-
man Act under section 3(b). The Insurance Bd. of Cleveland
cases merely extend this principle to other practices.
B. TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 3 (b)
At the present time, the only provision of the federal antitrust
laws which provides for private treble damage actions is section
4 of the Clayton Act.1°3 Thus, there is some question as to
whether treble damage actions may be maintained under the
McCarran Act since section 3 (b) refers only to Sherman Act vio-
lations."4 While the Sherman Act formerly provided for treble
damage actions," 5 that provision was repealed in 1955 because
it had been incorporated into section 4 of the Clayton Act in
1914.116 Congress felt that the Sherman Act provision was no
longer necessary.' Thus, when the McCarran Act was adopted
in 1945, the treble damage provision of the Sherman Act was not
being used. Since section 3 (b) of the McCarran Act continues the
federal regulation of boycotts, coercion, and intimidation in the
insurance industry only under the Sherman Act, treble damages
might seem to be unavailable to private persons against insurance
company violators. However, in Professional & Business Men's Life
Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co.,' a district court pointed out that
despite the repeal of the Sherman Act's provision for treble dam-
age actions, the remedy was in fact a part of the Sherman Act
when the McCarran Act was adopted. Therefore, a treble damage
action is provided for by section 3(b) to the extent that such an
action was permitted under the former Sherman Act provision. 0 9
103. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
104. See note 15 supra.
105. 26Stat. 210 (1890).
106. 69 Stat. 283 (1955).
107. S. RuP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
108. 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958).
109. The court first held that § 3(b) of the McCarran Act saved the
private right of action for treble damages because § 4 of the Clayton Act
"is as much a part of the Sherman Act as it is of the Clayton Act . .. .
163 F. Supp. at 283. When it was called to the attention of the court
that § 7 (the treble damages provision of the Sherman Act) had been re-
pealed, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), the court requested further briefs and argu-
ments on the question of the effect of that repeal on the treble damage
action under § 3(b) of the McCarran Act. The court then concluded that
the repeal of § 7 of the Sherman Act had no effect on the private action
for treble damages under the McCarran Act even though that right of
action was incorporated in the McCarran Act by reference to the Sher-
man Act. 163 F. Supp. at 292-95. The Supreme Court has frequently
applied the rule of construction that where a statute adopts by refer-
ence a specific statute, the adopting statute is not affected by subsequent
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The private suit merges antitrust policy with private compen-
sation. Private treble damage actions are permitted for two rea-
sons: (1) to utilize private interests in enforcing the antitrust
laws1 ' and (2) to provide compensation to injured parties."'
These reasons apply to insurance industry violations just as they
do to violations in other industries. Thus, although the McCarran
Act requires the private treble damage complainant to rely on a
different statutory base when he sues an insurance company or
insurance agents association, the remedy still exists.
C. CAN THE STATES FRUSTRATE SECTION 3(b)?
Prior to the enactment of the McCarran Act, the Supreme
Court held in Parker v. Brown" 2 that a state could establish a
program which restricted competition and fixed prices in violation
of the Sherman Act. The Court said that although such actions
would warrant sanctions under the Sherman Act if they were per-
formed by a person, the Sherman Act did not apply to state ac-
tion.13
In light of this decision, the question arises whether the states
might avoid the impact of section 3(b) and provide immunity to
rating bureaus and trade associations by assuming their functions
-that is, by designating them as "governmental agents."'" As
"governmental agents," however, these bodies would still be sub-
ject to congressional control. As Parker noted, where Congress
clearly pre-empts an area, the states cannot regulate. However, in
Parker the California regulations were not contrary to all fed-
eral regulation, but instead conformed to the Secretary of Agri-
amendments, modifications, or repeal of the adopted statute. E.g., Hassett
v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938); In re Heath, 144 U.S. 92 (1892); Kendall
v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
Subsequently, another federal district court allowed a treble damage suit
to be brought under § 3(b) although it did not discuss the statutory ba-
sis of the action. California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
110. 51 CONG. RFc. 16319 (1914).
111. 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914).
112. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
113. Id. at 350. The Court noted that the Sherman Act only applied
to "persons" and there was nothing in the Sherman Act itself or in its
legislative history to indicate that it was to be applied to the states. Id. at
351.
114. One former assistant United States Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division has asserted that the McCarran Act will eventually
be construed to require the courts to strike down state laws which pre-
vent insurance companies from competing. Bergson, Regulation v. Compe-
tition, 1956 INs. L.J. 703. This article pointed out that several states were
thinking of promulgating uniform rates to which all companies in the state
must adhere; other states were standardizing policy forms. Id. at 706.
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culture's orders issued under the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ments Act of 1938. Thus, the conflict that existed was really be-
tween two federal statutes." 5 Moreover, section 3(b) clearly
states that the McCarran Act does not render the Sherman Act
inapplicable to "any agreement to . . . or act" of boycott, coer-
cion, and intimidation. This arguably constitutes a pre-emption by
the federal government of control of these activities." 6 Under this
view, state law could not infringe upon this area. Clearly, this
is what Congress intended.l"r Section 3(b) was placed in the
McCarran Act to provide for an irreducible area of federal juris-
diction."' This field of regulation was not meant to be determin-
ed by state law. Therefore, to allow state law to nullify section
3(b) would appear to run counter to the manifest purpose of the
McCarran Act. Nevertheless, at least one state court has applied
the Parker doctrine to a state-established rating bureau."1 9 But
that court did not indicate whether it considered the pre-emption
argument.
115. 317 U.S. at 362.
116. See Bergson, Regulation v. Competition, 1956 INs. L.J. 703,
707. This construction may be strained, however, because § 3(b) of the
McCarran Act makes no explicit provisions in regard to boycotts, coer-
cion, or intimidation. The provision is merely that "Nothing contained in
this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agree-
ment to boycott, coerce or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimi-
dation." 59 Stat. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1958).
Thus, this section can also be argued to be only a limitation on the Mc-
Carran Act and not a pre-emption of state action. But see note 117 in-
Ira.
117.
Nothing in this bill is to be so construed as indicating it to be the
intent or desire of Congress to require or encourage the several
States to enact legislation that would make it compulsory for any in-
surance company to become a member of rating bureaus or charge
uniform rates. It is the opinion of Congress that competitive rates
are in the public interest.
H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). The result of state
legislated rates or agent's commissions would be Sherman Act immunity
for the insurance business if the Parker doctrine were applied to state ac-
tion under the McCarran Act. Congress, however, rejected such a result
when it passed the McCarran Act. It is evident from the Senate debate
on the McCarran Act that Congress did not intend for Parker v. Brown
to affect § 3(b) in any way.
I take it that the Senator is apprehensive lest a statute by a State
attempting to give validity to a private agreement to regulate would
be recognized under [Parker v. Brown] . . . . I have no doubt in
my own mind that no State . . . could give authority to violate
the Sherman antitrust law.
91 CONG. REc. 1480 (1945) (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney).
118. Compare with note 49 supra.
119. Insurance Co. v. Insurance Comm'n, 237 Miss. 759, 772, 116
So. 2d 224, 228 (1959).
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CONCLUSION
The McCarran Act provides two routes by which the insurance
industry may be subject to federal antitrust regulation. The first
requires a showing that the states have not regulated within the
meaning of section 2(b). Since "regulation" requires more than
mere "legislation," state laws pre-empt federal antitrust laws only
where it is demonstrated that the state laws also provide for en-
forcement. Whether the question is one of jurisdictional compe-
tence to regulate, as in the case of the unauthorized foreign in-
surer, or whether the question is one of sufficient statutory cover-
age of the field, as in the case of Clayton Act violations, the re-
quirement of effective state regulation determines federal jurisdic-
tion.
The second route for federal regulation is provided by section
3(b). It provides for the application of the Sherman Act to the
insurance industry regardless of state regulation in cases involving
boycotts, coercion or intimidation. Thus, not only are state au-
thorized rating bureaus and trade associations subject to federal
antitrust laws, but also the states cannot prevent federal regula-
tion under section 3 (b) by making these rating bureaus and trade
associations agents of the state.
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